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Introduction
On December 17, 2007, former New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine 
signed into law a bill that abolished his state’s death penalty, saying 
he felt a “moral duty to end ‘state-endorsed killing.’”1 With Corzine’s 
signature, New Jersey became the fourteenth state to eradicate the 
death penalty,2 and the first to do so legislatively since Iowa and West 
Virginia legislators did away with capital punishment in 1965.3 The vote 
by New Jersey lawmakers followed close, but ultimately unsuccess-
ful, votes on similar bills in Colorado, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, 
and New Mexico earlier in 2007.4 And while it took more than thirty-
one years for the first state to repeal its post-Gregg v. Georgia5 death 
penalty statute legislatively, it took only fifteen months for the second 
state to follow; on March 18, 2009, former New Mexico Governor Bill 
Richardson signed legislation to repeal his state’s capital punishment 
statute, saying that his “conscience compel[led him] to replace the 
death penalty” with a sentence of life in prison without the possibility 
of parole.6 Less than two years after New Mexico jettisoned capital pun-
ishment, Illinois became the third state to do so legislatively in the post-
Gregg era, when Governor Pat Quinn signed a bill repealing the death 
penalty on March 9, 2011, eleven years after former Governor George 
Ryan declared a moratorium on executions in the state.7 Finally, when 
Connecticut Governor Dannel P. Malloy, a former prosecutor, signed a 
bill to abolish his state’s death penalty on April 25, 2012—calling it “a 
moment for sober reflection, not celebration”—he made Connecticut 
the fourth state in just over five years to eradicate capital punishment 
via legislative repeal.8
As of December 2012, seventeen states and the District of Columbia 
have eliminated capital punishment.9 Ten states have not had the death 
penalty since before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman 
v. Georgia10 temporarily imposed a de facto nationwide moratorium 
on capital punishment, while Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and the 
1 Craig R. McCoy, N.J. First to Abolish the Death Penalty, Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1.
2 States With and Without the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
3 Patrick Tyrrell & Nancy Hewitt, Op-Ed., Beyond New Jersey: The Inevitability of Death Penalty 
Repeal, Las Cruces Sun-News, Dec. 24, 2007.
4 Bradley Olson & Jennifer McMenamin, Death Penalty Revoked in N.J., Balt. Sun, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1.
5 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6 Dan Boyd, Richardson Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty in N.M., Albuquerque J., Mar. 19, 2009, at 
A1 [hereinafter Richardson Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty].
7 Steve Mills, Illinois Bans Death Penalty, Chi. Trib., Mar. 10, 2011, at A1.
8 Daniela Altimari, Governor Signs Measure Eliminating Capital Punishment, Hartford Courant, 
Apr. 26, 2012, at A1.
9 States With and Without the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
10 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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District of Columbia got rid of their death penalty statutes in the early-
mid 1980s.11 Since 1984, five states have abolished capital punishment, 
and each has done so in the last eight years: New York in 2004 via judi-
cial decision and New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), 
and Connecticut (2012) via legislative repeal.12 This nationwide flurry 
of legislative activity comes as public support for the death penalty, 
while still relatively strong, has nonetheless slipped as DNA evidence 
continues to exonerate scores of death row inmates.13 Cases like that 
of Troy Davis—a black man convicted of the 1989 murder of a white 
police officer in Georgia and executed on September 21, 2011 in the 
face of recanted testimony and other dubious evidence—continue to 
galvanize anti-death penalty forces and lead to renewed calls for a 
reconsideration of capital punishment in America.14
This Article examines legislative repeal of the death penalty and 
argues that abolition of capital punishment by legislative action is not 
only more democratically legitimate than repeal by judicial fiat, but 
also more likely to convince the U.S. Supreme Court that capital pun-
ishment violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment in light of “evolving standards of decency.”15 
Because judges lack the democratic accountability of legislators,16 
judicial decisions lack the institutional legitimacy of legislative action 
when it comes to controversial and divisive issues such as capital 
punishment.17 Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized the primacy 
11 The District of Columbia struck its death penalty statute from the books in 1981, while 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island did so in 1984. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, 
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
12 Id.
13 See John Schwartz, In the Debate on Capital Punishment, Davis Execution Offers Little Closure, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 23, 2011, at A17 (noting that while an October 2010 Gallup poll pegged public support 
for the death penalty at 64 percent, down from a high of 80 percent in 1994, the public is “almost 
evenly split” on whether life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an acceptable 
alternative to the death penalty); see also id. (“Jurors have shown a growing reluctance to vote for 
the ultimate penalty; in 1994, 314 people were placed on death row, but that number has dropped 
by roughly two-thirds since.”).
14 See id. (noting “the outpouring of protest worldwide” upon Troy Davis’ execution).
15 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not 
precise, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
16 See Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 Yale L.J. 1897, 1929 (2005) (“[J]udicial 
review involves a group of people who seemingly enjoy no democratic legitimacy . . . but who 
nevertheless thwart the policies of democratic branches of government.”). But see Christopher 
J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1454, 1458 (2000) (“[T]he 
judiciary . . . occupies a central place in the American ideal of deliberative democracy, a place 
coequal to those taken by the political departments.”).
17 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 410–11 (1995) (discussing the 
idea that the Supreme Court has been wary, in the decades following Furman and Gregg, to make 
sweeping death penalty pronouncements due to their cost in terms of institutional legitimacy).
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of legislative action in the states in informing “evolving standards of 
decency” when it held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to 
mentally retarded defendants in Atkins v. virginia.18 Evolving standards 
of decency, Justice Stevens noted, “should be informed by ‘objective 
factors to the maximum possible extent.’”19 The Court added that the 
“clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”20 As such, accord-
ing to Colleen Cunningham, a staff member at the anti-death penalty 
organization Equal Justice USA,21 widespread repeal of the death 
penalty by state legislatures would do more to convince the Supreme 
Court that nationwide “evolving standards of decency” mandate an 
end to capital punishment than would piecemeal judicial repeal in the 
state courts.22
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I illustrates the strategy of 
capital punishment abolitionists nationwide by discussing the relative 
superiority of legislative action vis-à-vis judicial decree in the context 
of the death penalty and “evolving standards of decency.” To do so, 
it analogizes to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins and Roper v. 
Simmons23 to illustrate the type and breadth of legislative action the 
Court has recently found sufficient to constitute an “evolving stan-
dard[] of decency” for death penalty purposes. Part II examines in 
detail the repeal processes in New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, and 
Connecticut—the four states that have legislatively abrogated their 
death penalty statutes since 2007. It catalogues the legislative progres-
sion in each state and, where possible, evaluates how courts, legisla-
tors, and the public have reacted to abolition there. To do so, it looks to 
judicial decisions in the wake of repeal, to dissenting legislators’ failed 
attempts to reinstate the death penalty, and to newspaper editorials 
that reflect public opinion in the states. Part III considers the likelihood 
that other states will legislatively repeal their death penalty statutes in 
the immediate or relatively near future and ponders how many states 
must abolish capital punishment altogether before the Supreme Court 
may be compelled to follow suit. Part IV briefly concludes.
18 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
19 Id. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)).
20 Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
21 About EJUSA, Equal Justice USA, http://www.ejusa.org/about (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). Equal 
Justice USA is a national, grassroots organization dedicated to nationwide repeal of the death 
penalty. Id.
22 Telephone Interview with Colleen Cunningham, State Campaign Organizer, Equal Justice USA 
(Mar. 28, 2012) (on file with the author). 
23 543 U.S. 551 (2005). While Atkins held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to mentally 
retarded defendants, Roper barred imposition of capital punishment against defendants who were 
under 18 when they committed their crimes. Id.
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I. The Importance of Legislative Repeal: Legislative Supremacy, 
The Death Penalty & The U.S. Supreme Court
The idea that legislatures are more institutionally authoritative than 
courts is central to the American system of government.24 Legislators 
are, after all, democratically accountable to their constituents while 
(unelected) judges are not.25 As a result, the notion of “legislative 
supremacy,” which is written into Article I of the Constitution and is 
considered a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation, generally 
gives lawmakers’ actions more weight than judges’ pronouncements.26
The U.S. Supreme Court’s use of the doctrine of statutory stare 
decisis illustrates this principle in action: the Court is usually more 
reluctant to abandon its statutory precedent than it is to overrule its 
constitutional precedent, and it therefore gives “special force” to its 
statutory decisions.27 There are a couple of reasons for this. One is prac-
tical: in the context of constitutional precedent, “correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible,”28 but when it comes to 
statutory interpretation, Congress can respond to a judicial decision 
24 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 281, 
281 (1989) (“It is commonplace that . . . judges are subordinate to legislatures in the making of 
public policy.”); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified 
Intentionalist Approach, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1988) (referring to the “deeply-embedded premise of 
the American political system . . . that, within constitutional limits, the legislature . . . has authority 
to prescribe rules of law that, until changed legislatively, bind all other governmental actors 
within the system”); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 
1346, 1391 (2006) (“The system of legislative elections is . . . superior as a matter of democracy and 
democratic values to the indirect and limited basis of democratic legitimacy for the judiciary.”). 
Compare U.S. Const. art. I (delineating Congress’ many powers), with U.S. Const. art. III 
(delineating the judiciary’s relatively fewer powers). See generally Larry D. Kramer, The People 
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004) (noting that the Founders 
intended Congress and state legislatures to have primacy over the judiciary and that they did not 
contemplate the doctrine of judicial review).
25 See Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 41–42 (1st ed. 1985) 
(attributing judicial subordination to legislatures to judges’ lack of democratic accountability); 
Waldron, supra note 24, at 1391 (“Legislators are regularly accountable to their constituents and 
they behave as though their electoral credentials were important in relation to the overall ethos of 
their participation in political decisionmaking. None of this is true of Justices.”).
26 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2389 (2003) (“[L]egislative 
intent is widely assumed to be the touchstone of statutory interpretation.”).
27 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“[T]he burden borne by the 
party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked 
to overrule a point of statutory construction”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 280–84 (1972) (refusing 
to overturn statutory precedent despite widespread criticism of the prior decisions). See generally 
Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317 (2005) 
(providing an overview of statutory stare decisis and discussing its (in)applicability in the federal 
Courts of Appeals).
28 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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by repealing, rewriting or leaving in place the law in question.29 This 
stems from the idea that Congressional silence in the wake of a judi-
cial decision indicates Congress’s tacit approval of that decision.30 A 
related but distinct rationale for the doctrine of statutory stare decisis 
has its origins in legislative supremacy and respect for the separation 
of powers: legislators, not judges, are democracy’s primary policymak-
ers and changes to issues of statutory interpretation therefore ought to 
come from legislatures, not courts.31 Scholars generally agree that the 
latter rationale is stronger than the former, stressing that Congressional 
silence is often meaningless while separation of powers and legisla-
tive supremacy carry great weight.32 And while the roots of statutory 
stare decisis extend into history, the doctrine is alive and well today, as 
illustrated by its invocation in two recent Supreme Court decisions.33
Moreover, though the doctrine of statutory stare decisis is gener-
ally associated with the U.S. Supreme Court and its relationship with 
Congress, its logic applies equally to state supreme courts and their 
relationships with their respective state legislatures.34 Thus, the widely-
accepted idea of legislative supremacy (and its treatment as illustrated 
by the doctrine of statutory stare decisis) indicates that courts—and 
29 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73 (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area 
of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the 
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”); see 
also Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 859, 870 (2012) (“[S]tare decisis should be observed particularly strictly 
in the statutory context because Congress may intervene to supersede prior judicial interpretations.”).
30 Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84 (refusing to overturn dubious statutory precedent because “Congress, by 
its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and . . . has clearly evinced a 
desire not to disapprove them legislatively”); see also Barrett, supra note 27, at 317 (“[T]he [Supreme] 
Court’s practice of giving its statutory precedent particularly forceful effect reflects its reluctance to 
abandon statutory interpretations that Congress, through its silence, has effectively approved.”).
31 Flood, 407 U.S. at 284 (“If there is any inconsistency or illogic in [our statutory precedent], it is 
an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by Congress and not by this 
Court.”); see also Barrett, supra note 27, at 317–18 (“[Statutory stare decisis] gains this special force 
from the principle of legislative supremacy—the belief that Congress, rather than the Supreme 
Court, bears primary responsibility for shaping policy through statutory law.”); Amy Barrett, 
Statutory Stare Decisis, PrawfsBlawg (Apr. 2, 2008, 12:23 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2008/04/statutory-stare.html (“[H]eightened stare decisis effect respects separation of 
powers by shifting policymaking responsibility back to Congress, where it belongs.”).
32 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 27, at 318 (“[T]he connection between statutory stare decisis and the 
separation of powers provides far more credible support for the doctrine than does a theory of 
congressional acquiescence.”).
33 See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 260 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In matters of statutory interpretation, . . . principles of 
stare decisis have their greatest effect . . . .”); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 
130, 139 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has special force . . . .”) (internal 
citations omitted).
34 Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, 
Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 767, 783–85, 791 (1991) 
(discussing the California Supreme Court’s use of the doctrine of statutory stare decisis in the 
1970s, 80s, and 90s).
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the U.S. Supreme Court in particular—give more weight to legislative 
action than to judicial opinions. And while this is certainly true as a 
general abstraction, it rings particularly true in the context of the death 
penalty and the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency.”
Twice in the last decade, the Supreme Court has struck down 
specific applications of the death penalty as violative of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment after 
determining that a “national consensus ha[d] developed against” the rel-
evant application.35 In both cases, the Court made this determination after 
a thorough review of the legislative activity occurring throughout the 
states.36 The rest of this Part examines more closely the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Atkins and Roper to illustrate how legislative activity in the 
states can persuade the Court that “evolving standards of decency” are 
such that particular applications of the death penalty violate the Eighth 
Amendment. By doing so, it implies that if enough state legislatures 
ban the death penalty altogether, the Supreme Court eventually will be 
compelled to issue a blanket ruling banning capital punishment in all 
cases—an implication confronted head on in Parts II and III.
A. Eliminating the Death Penalty  
for the Mentally Retarded: Atkins v. Virginia
Around midnight on August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins and an 
accomplice abducted and robbed Eric Nesbitt before driving him to 
an ATM, where they forced him to withdraw additional cash.37 Atkins 
and his accomplice, William Jones, subsequently drove Nesbitt to a 
“secluded area” where they shot and killed him.38 At trial, both defen-
dants testified that the other had actually shot and killed Nesbitt and 
because Jones’ testimony “was both more coherent and credible than 
Atkins’,” it was given greater effect by the jury and deemed sufficient 
to establish Atkins’ guilt.39
At the penalty phase of Atkins’ capital murder trial, the defense 
relied on the testimony of Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic psychologist 
who determined that Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded” when he 
examined the defendant before trial.40 Moreover, a standard IQ test 
indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59, a verbal IQ of 64, and a 
35 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional as 
applied to mentally retarded defendants); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding 
the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to defendants who were under 18 when they 
committed their crimes).
36 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67 (compiling an overview of state legislation); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17 (same).
37 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 449 (Va. 1999), rev’d, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
38 Id.
39 Atkins, 536 U.S at 307.
40 Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 451.
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performance IQ of 60.41 Despite these questions concerning the defen-
dant’s competence, however, the jury sentenced Atkins to death not 
once, but twice.42 On automatic appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, 
Atkins relied on his low IQ score for his argument that he “is mentally 
retarded and thus cannot be sentenced to death.”43 But the Virginia 
Supreme Court rejected Atkins’ argument and affirmed his death 
sentence because “execution of a defendant who is mentally retarded 
does not contravene the practices that were condemned when the Bill 
of Rights was adopted or the evolving standards of decency.”44 The 
Virginia Court based its decision largely on Penry v. Lynaugh, a U.S. 
Supreme Court case which held that imposition of the death penalty on 
a mentally retarded defendant did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment solely due to the 
defendant’s mental retardation.45
Two Virginia Supreme Court Justices dissented, arguing that, “the 
imposition of the sentence of death upon a criminal defendant who has 
the mental age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive.”46 
It was their dissents, as well as a “dramatic shift in the state legislative 
landscape,” that convinced the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari 
to revisit the constitutionality of the death penalty for mentally retarded 
defendants, a proposition it first addressed (and upheld) in Penry.47 It is 
to this “dramatic shift” that this Article now turns.
1. Legislative Repeal of Capital Punishment  
for Mentally Retarded Defendants
The Eighth Amendment clearly prohibits “excessive” sanctions.48 
Whether a particular punishment is excessive, however, is determined 
by the standards that “currently prevail”—not by those that existed 
41 Id. To put these figures in perspective, as of 2006, the average estimated IQ for a person living 
in Virginia was 101.9. See Michael A. McDaniel, Estimating State IQ: Measurement Challenges 
and Preliminary Correlates, 34 Intelligence 607, 612 (2006), available at http://www.people.vcu.
edu/~mamcdani/Publications/McDaniel%20(2006)%20Estimating%20state%20IQ.pdf (tabulating 
average estimated IQs for all fifty states).
42 Atkins, 536 U.S at 309. On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing 
hearing after determining the trial court had issued a misleading jury form. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 
457 (Va. 1999).
43 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (Va. 2000).
44 Id. at 318–19.
45 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (“[W]e cannot conclude today that the Eighth 
Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person . . . convicted of a capital 
offense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone.”).
46 Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 324 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
47 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
48 U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,  
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
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when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.49 Thus, the Amendment’s 
meaning changes over time and is informed by “the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”50 Writing for 
the majority in Atkins, Justice Stevens noted that “evolving standards 
of decency” should take their cues from “‘objective factors to the maxi-
mum possible extent.’”51 The Court added that the “‘clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation 
enacted by the country’s legislatures.’”52 Prior to Atkins, the Court used 
such legislative evidence to hold the death penalty unconstitutionally 
excessive punishment for raping an adult woman,53 or as applied to the 
insane,54 to defendants under age 16 at the time of their offenses,55 and to 
defendants “who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended 
to take life.”56 In so doing, the Court noted that the legislative posture 
need not be “‘wholly unanimous among state legislatures’” to justify 
abandoning the practice;57 rather, the evidence need only “weigh[] on 
the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.”58
The Court in Atkins provided an exhaustive history of the legis-
lative action regarding execution of mentally retarded defendants.59 
Excluding the fourteen states that had abolished the death penalty 
entirely by the mid-1980s,60 the first state to legislatively eradicate 
capital punishment as applied to mentally retarded defendants was 
Georgia in 1986.61 The federal government followed in 1988, when 
Congress enacted legislation that expressly provided that a “sen-
tence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally 
retarded.”62 In 1989, Maryland became the second state to legislatively 
49 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that 
prevailed . . . when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.”).
50 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not 
precise, and . . . their scope is not static.”).
51 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)).
52 Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
53 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
54 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
55 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
56 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787, 792–93 (1982).
57 Id. at 792–93 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596).
58 Id. at 793.
59 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17.
60 This count includes both the District of Columbia and New York. The latter had no death 
penalty between 1965 and 1994, but briefly reinstituted capital punishment between 1995 and 2004, 
a period during which it executed no one. In 2004, the New York Court of Appeals declared that 
capital punishment violated the New York Constitution. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 
2004); see also States With and Without the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
61 Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(j) (1988).
62 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(l), 102 Stat. 4390 (1988). Congress 
included the same language when it expanded the federal death penalty law in 1994. Federal 
Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (1994).
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ban the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants.63 Notably, 
when the Supreme Court decided Penry in 1989, it explicitly stated that 
the Georgia and Maryland statutes alone “do not provide sufficient 
evidence at present of a national consensus” to ban the death penalty 
as applied to mentally retarded defendants.64
But, the Atkins Court noted, much changed in the wake of Penry.65 
Ten state legislatures passed laws similar to those in Georgia and 
Maryland between 1990 and 1998.66 Six additional states followed suit 
in 2000 and 2001.67 Categorical exclusions for the mentally retarded 
had also passed at least one legislative body in other states, including 
Nevada and Virginia, by the time the Court decided Atkins.68 Even the 
Texas Legislature passed a similar bill in 2001, though Governor Rick 
Perry vetoed it.69 Importantly, the Court noted, “[i]t is not so much the 
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the 
direction of change.”70 In making this point, the Court noted that many 
states had passed legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally 
retarded defendants while there was a “complete absence of States 
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions.”71 
Such a trend, the Court said, indicated “powerful evidence” of the 
country’s views regarding the culpability of mentally retarded crimi-
nals.72 Finally, the Court observed that even among states that did permit 
the execution of mentally retarded defendants in 2002, when Atkins 
was decided, the practice was rare.73 Specifically, the Court noted that 
while New Hampshire and New Jersey authorized the practice, they 
had not carried out the execution of a mentally retarded offender in 
decades.74 According to the Court, therefore, there was “little need 
63 Md. Code Ann., Art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (1989) (current version at Md. Code Ann., Crim Law 
§ 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (West 2012)).
64 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
65 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 (noting that “state legislatures across the country began to address the 
issue [of executing mentally retarded defendants]” after the Supreme Court decided Penry).
66 See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-9-401 (1993); Ind. Code § 35-36-9-2 
to -6 (1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623 (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.130, .135, .140 (1990); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 28-105.01 (1998); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1 (1991); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27 
(1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (1990); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (1993).
67 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (2001); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46a (2001); Fla. Stat.  
§ 921.137 (2001); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030 (2001); 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 45; S.D. Codified Laws  
§ 23A-27A-26.1 (2000).
68 See S. 497, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002); H.B. 957, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002); A. B. 353, 71st Reg. Sess. 
(Nev. 2001).
69 See S. 686, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); H.B. 236, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); see also Gov. Rick 
Perry, Veto Proclamation, H.B. 236, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001).
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to pursue legislation barring the execution of the mentally retarded 
in those States” prior to Atkins.75
Given the weight and direction of the legislative evidence, the Court 
concluded, “it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed 
against it.”76 Justice Stevens reached this conclusion after an “indepen-
dent evaluation of the issue” that “reveal[ed] no reason to disagree 
with the judgment of the [state] legislatures . . . that death is not a suit-
able punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”77 Thus, pursuant 
to its “narrowing jurisprudence” regarding capital punishment,78 the 
Court held that the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in light of our “evolving standards of decency.”79
B. Eliminating the Death Penalty for Minors: Roper v. Simmons
Less than three years after it decided Atkins, the Supreme Court 
continued to narrow its death penalty jurisprudence when it ruled in 
Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of 
offenders who were under 18 when they committed their crimes.80 In 
Roper, as in Atkins, the Court explicitly overruled precedent fewer than 
twenty years old.
In 1993, when he was a 17-year-old junior in high school, 
Christopher Simmons and his 15-year-old accomplice Charles 
Benjamin abducted Shirley Crook in Fenton, Missouri.81 The two 
boys used duct tape to cover Crook’s eyes and mouth and to tie her 
hands before loading her in her minivan and driving to a nearby state 
park.82 There, they put a towel over Crook’s head and walked her 
to a bridge spanning the Meramec River, where they tied her hands 
and feet together with electrical wire.83 They then threw her from the 
bridge, and she drowned in the waters below.84 After bragging about 
the murder to his friends, Simmons confessed to it when the police 
interrogated him about his involvement.85





80 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
81 State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169–70 (Mo. 2003), rev’d sub nom. State ex rel. Simmons v. 
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The State tried Simmons as an adult and won a guilty verdict after 
the defense called no witnesses.86 During closing arguments at the 
penalty phase of his trial, the prosecution sought to portray Simmons’ 
age as an aggravating factor—defense counsel, of course, relied heav-
ily on Simmons’ age as a mitigating factor—stating to the jury, “Think 
about age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you? 
Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.”87 The jury 
recommended the death penalty and the trial judge imposed it.88
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Simmons’ death 
sentence and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.89 These deci-
sions were based in large part on Stanford v. Kentucky, a U.S. Supreme 
Court case which held that imposition of the death penalty on a defen-
dant for a crime committed at age 16 or 17 did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
solely on account of the defendant’s age.90 Shortly after denying certio-
rari in Simmons’ case, however, the Supreme Court decided Atkins.91 
In its wake, Simmons filed a new petition for relief in state court, argu-
ing that Atkins’ logic applied to defendants facing execution for crimes 
committed before their 18th birthdays and that Stanford should thus be 
overruled, just as Penry was by Atkins.92 The Missouri Supreme Court 
agreed, finding that “a national consensus has developed against the 
execution of juvenile offenders.”93 The Missouri Court therefore set 
aside Simmons’ death sentence and re-sentenced him to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.94 This time, the Supreme Court did 
grant certiorari when the State appealed, using Simmons’ case to 
revisit the constitutionality of the death penalty for juvenile offend-
ers on the heels of the legislative evidence offered by the Missouri 
Supreme Court.95
86 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
87 Id. at 558.
88 Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 170.
89 Id. at 169, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953 (1997).
90 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“We discern neither a historical nor a modern 
societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who murders at 
16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that such punishment does not offend the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”).
91 See supra Part I.A. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Simmons’ case in October 2001 and 
decided Atkins in June 2002.
92 State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003).
93 Id. (noting that eighteen states had banned executions for juveniles by 2003, that twelve others 
barred the death penalty altogether, that not one state had lowered its age of execution below 18 
since Stanford was decided in 1989, and that five states had raised or established the minimum age 
of eligibility for capital punishment to 18 between 1989 and 2003).
94 Id. at 400.
95 Id. at 399, cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
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1. Legislative Repeal of Capital Punishment  
for Juvenile Offenders
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
which barred as unconstitutional the application of the death penalty 
to defendants who were under 16 when they committed their crimes.96 
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens observed that all “18 States 
that have expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty 
statutes . . . require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 
at the time of the capital offense.”97 The Court in Thompson catalogued 
the death penalty statutes in these eighteen states (as well as the laws 
of various foreign countries) before reaching its determination that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a defendant who was 
under 16 at the time of his offense.98
The next year, however, the Court decided in Stanford that the death 
penalty was a constitutionally permissible punishment for defendants 
who were 16 or 17 when they committed their capital offenses.99 Over 
the dissenting opinion of four Justices, the Court—speaking through 
Justice Scalia—used legislative evidence as proof that “neither a his-
torical nor a modern societal consensus forbid[s] the imposition of 
capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of 
age.”100 The Court noted that twenty-two of the thirty-seven states 
with the death penalty on their books at the time permitted the execu-
tion of 16-year-olds, while twenty-five permitted it for 17-year-olds 
and determined that these numbers did “not establish the degree of 
national consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label 
a particular punishment cruel and unusual.”101 The Court took up this 
narrow question once again in Roper.
As in Atkins, the Court in Roper began its reconsideration of prec-
edent with “a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in 
particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the 
question,” noting that such objective indicia provide the Court with 
“essential instruction.”102 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy noted 
many similarities between Roper and Atkins and observed that by 2005, 
thirty states prohibited the execution of all juvenile offenders—includ-
ing those aged 16 or 17 when they committed their crimes.103 Just as the 
96 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
97 Id. at 829.
98 Id. at 838.
99 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
100 Id. at 380.
101 Id. at 370-71.
102 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
103 Id. This total included twelve states that, at the time, had abandoned the death penalty entirely 
and eighteen that maintained capital punishment but specifically excluded all juvenile offenders 
from its reach. See id.
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Atkins Court noted the rarity with which mentally retarded defendants 
were executed even in states that legally permitted the practice, the Roper 
Court observed that only three states (Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia) 
had executed a prisoner for a crime committed as a juvenile in the pre-
ceding ten years.104 Even Kevin Stanford—who lent his name to the 
Supreme Court case—had his sentence commuted by former Kentucky 
Governor Paul Patton.105 Despite the many similarities to Atkins, the 
Roper Court did address a key difference between the two cases with 
regard to legislative activity in the states: while sixteen states banned 
the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants in 
the thirteen years between Penry and Atkins, only five did so for 16- and 
17-year-old offenders in the sixteen years between Stanford and Roper.106 
And yet, despite the decreased rate of abolition, the Court stated that, 
“the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated,” 
in part because “no State that previously prohibited capital punish-
ment for juveniles has reinstated it [since Stanford].”107 Given these 
“objective indicia of consensus,” the Court determined that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the execution of defendants who were under 18 
when they committed their crimes.108
II. Case Studies: Legislative Repeal in New Jersey,  
New Mexico, Illinois, & Connecticut
The previous Part begs an obvious question: given the Supreme 
Court’s narrowing death penalty jurisprudence and the precedent set 
by Atkins and Roper, how many state legislatures must repeal their 
death penalty statutes before the Supreme Court determines that a 
“national consensus” has developed against capital punishment alto-
gether? Currently, seventeen states and the District of Columbia bar 
capital punishment for all crimes.109 How many more must abrogate 
it before the Supreme Court is left with no choice but to determine 
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment in light of our “evolving stan-
dards of decency” and holds its use unconstitutional once and for all? 
Logic would suggest that once a majority of states have abolished their 
death penalties, a “national consensus” has developed against capital 
104 Id. at 564–65.
105 See Andrew Wolfson, Patton Pardons 4 in Election Case and Will Commute Death Sentence, 
Courier-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 19, 2003, at A1.
106 Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. These five states are: Washington (judicially in 1993), Montana (1999), 
Kansas (2001), Indiana (2002), and New York (2002). State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 
397, 408 (Mo. 2003).
107 Roper, 543 U.S. at 566.
108 Id. at 567, 578.
109 States With and Without the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
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punishment. But, as the Supreme Court noted in Atkins and as Part I 
further illustrated, “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is 
significant” when making the “national consensus” inquiry.110 Rather, 
there are other factors that will inform the Supreme Court’s reason-
ing—among them “the consistency of the direction of change”111—and 
while the recent spate of legislative repeal in the states is a step toward 
nationwide abolition, anti-death penalty advocates believe it is only 
a start.112 The rest of this Article probes the questions posed above. 
This Part examines the legislative repeal process in New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Illinois, and Connecticut to illustrate how state legislatures 
are grappling with repeal and how lawmakers, courts, and the general 
public have reacted to abolition. Part III then looks ahead to evaluate 
which other states might soon legislatively abrogate their death penal-
ties and to speculate about how many must do so before the Supreme 
Court may be required to conclude that a “national consensus” has 
developed against its imposition.
A. New Jersey Becomes the First State Since 1965  
to Legislatively Repeal Its Death Penalty
On January 22, 1963, New Jersey executed Ralph Hudson in the 
electric chair after Hudson was convicted of stabbing his estranged 
wife to death as she worked in an Atlantic City restaurant.113 After 
Hudson’s death, however, the State did not impose the death pen-
alty on anyone before the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a de facto 
nationwide moratorium on capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia in 
1972.114 The Supreme Court lifted the moratorium and reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of capital punishment with its 1976 decision in Gregg 
v. Georgia,115 and New Jersey reinstituted its death penalty six years 
later.116 However, despite imposing more than four dozen death sen-
tences between 1982 and 2007—including some affirmed by the State’s 
highest court117—New Jersey executed no one during that time.118 Thus, 
while the State had an active death penalty for more than thirty-four 
110 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002); see also supra Part I.A-B.
111 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
112 See Interview with Colleen Cunningham, supra note 22. 
113 See Joseph F. Sullivan, High Court in New Jersey Upholds Death Penalties, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1992, 
at B5.
114 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
115 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
116 Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2007, at A1.
117 See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992) (affirming the death sentence of a man who 
was convicted of hiring a hit man to kill his wife).
118 Peters, supra note 116.
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years between 1963 and 2007, Hudson remains the last man executed 
in New Jersey.119
Practically, then, capital punishment has not existed in the Garden 
State for nearly fifty years. But the repeal process in New Jersey unof-
ficially began in 2004, when an appellate court held that the State’s pro-
cedures for administering the death penalty violated the New Jersey 
Constitution.120 The procedures, while rewritten, were never finalized, 
and they expired in 2005.121 The legislature got involved in 2006, when 
it passed a bill imposing a moratorium on executions in the State and 
creating the New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission.122 In January 
2007, the Commission recommended abolition of the death penalty by 
a 12-1 vote, noting that its imposition was “inconsistent with evolving 
standards of decency,” that there was “no compelling evidence” that 
capital punishment served a legitimate purpose, and that retention 
of the death penalty raised the specter of an “irreversible mistake.”123 
The only dissenting member of the Commission was John F. Russo, 
a former State Senator who sponsored the bill that reinstated capital 
punishment in New Jersey in 1982.124
In early 2007, as New Jersey lawmakers debated repeal, legisla-
tors in four other states—Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, and 
Nebraska—did the same.125 In February, Montana lawmakers pushed 
a repeal bill through the state Senate, but the state House Judiciary 
Committee killed the legislation in a 9-8 vote in March.126 Later that 
month, despite the strong support of Governor Martin O’Malley, 
Maryland legislators failed to repeal the death penalty in their state 
when a bill to end executions deadlocked 5-5 in a state Senate com-
mittee, a result which prevented the legislation from moving to the 
chamber floor.127 The same week that the Maryland legislation died in 
committee, Nebraska abolitionists lost their fight when a repeal bill fell 
one vote shy of moving to the second of three stages of consideration in 
the state’s unicameral legislature.128 Finally, lawmakers in New Mexico 
119 Id.
120 In re Readoption with Amendments of Death Penalty Regulations N.J.A.C. 10A:23, 842 A.2d 207 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
121 Peters, supra note 116.
122 Pub. L. No. 2005, ch. 321 (N.J. 2006).
123 N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm’n, N.J. Death Penalty Study Comm’n Report 23 (2007).
124 Id. at 79.
125 Keith B. Richburg, N.J. Approves Abolition of Death Penalty; Corzine to Sign, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 
2007, at A3.
126 Montana Assistant Attorney General Calls for Death Penalty Repeal, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2050 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
127 John Wagner & Ovetta Wiggins, Bid Fails to Repeal Death Penalty, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 2007, at 
B1.
128 Nebraska’s Death Penalty Repeal Bill Falls One vote Short, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/339 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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pushed repeal legislation through the state House in February 2007, 
only to see it die on the Senate floor shortly thereafter.129
But where legislators in other states fell short, New Jersey lawmak-
ers broke through. On May 10, 2007, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
approved by a vote of 8-2 a bill that would replace the death penalty 
with a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.130 
After seven months of inaction on the legislation, the New Jersey Senate 
passed the bill 21-16 on December 10, 2007—giving it the bare minimum 
number of votes required to pass the forty-member chamber.131 Three 
days later, the General Assembly passed the legislation 44-36, send-
ing it to then-Governor Jon Corzine’s desk.132 On December 17, 2007, 
Corzine, an outspoken and longtime opponent of capital punishment, 
both signed the measure into law—making New Jersey the first state to 
legislatively abolish the death penalty since 1965—and commuted the 
death sentences of the remaining eight inmates on the state’s death row 
to life in prison with no chance of parole.133
Not only were New Jersey lawmakers not the first in the modern 
era to take up the issue of legislative repeal, they were not even the first 
in the post-Gregg era to actually pass legislation repealing the death 
penalty: New Hampshire lawmakers voted to repeal capital punish-
ment in 2000 but then-Governor (and current U.S. Senator) Jeanne 
Shaheen immediately vetoed the bill.134 Nonetheless, aided by a con-
senting governor and a shifting (and favorable) political climate, the 
New Jersey legislature succeeded where others had failed. In so doing, 
New Jersey lawmakers set a precedent for other states to follow, but 
that precedent might have had less effect if the response to repeal was 
less positive than it was, both in New Jersey and nationwide. It is to this 
response that this Article now turns.
1. Reaction to Repeal in New Jersey
As New Jersey lawmakers debated—and then passed—the state’s 
death penalty repeal bill, they received the nearly unanimous support 
129 Legislative Activity — New Mexico, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
legislative-activity-new-mexico (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). But see infra Part II.B (discussing New 
Mexico legislators’ successful 2009 campaign to repeal the death penalty).
130 Ronald Smothers, New Jersey Moves Closer to Abolishing Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2007, 
at B4.
131 Jeremy W. Peters, With Senate vote, New Jersey Nears Historic Repeal of the Death Penalty, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 11, 2007, at B1.
132 Richburg, supra note 125.
133 Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes Sentences of 8, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 18, 2007, at B3.
134 New Hampshire Governor vetoes State Senate Bill to Abolish Death Penalty, Democracy Now!  
(May 22, 2000), http://www.democracynow.org/2000/5/22/new_hampshire_governor_vetoes_
state_senate; see also Richburg, supra note 125.
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of editorial boards both in their state and nationwide. The day the 
State Senate was to vote on repeal, a New Jersey newspaper opined in 
support of abolition that the bill could “point the Garden State and the 
nation toward more enlightened times.”135 Three days after Corzine 
signed the repeal bill, a different New Jersey newspaper expressed a 
similar view in support of repeal, stating that, “New Jersey is taking 
the lead nationwide . . . . It is not cowering to criminals. It is seeking 
justice.”136 After the New Jersey General Assembly passed the repeal 
bill, sending it to Corzine’s desk, a scathing anti-death penalty editorial 
in the New York Times began by noting the death penalty’s “moral bank-
ruptcy, social imbalance, legal impracticality and ultimate futility.”137 
It then took a similar tack as the New Jersey editorials noted above, 
expressing hope that repeal in New Jersey would be a catalyst for 
nationwide abolition: “[New Jersey lawmakers’] renunciation of the 
death penalty could prick the conscience of elected officials in other 
states and inspire them to muster the courage to revisit their own laws 
on capital punishment. At least that is our fervent hope.”138 Similar 
editorials—many of which expressed optimism that repeal in New 
Jersey would prompt a nationwide movement—appeared across the 
country.139
The vote prompted more than just abstract hopes that it might 
catalyze change, however. In the days and weeks after New Jersey 
lawmakers jettisoned capital punishment in their state, editorial boards 
and prominent figures in other states began clamoring for repeal of 
their own death penalty statutes. On December 17, 2007, before New 
Jersey’s repeal law was formally on the books, the Hartford Courant 
published an editorial urging Connecticut lawmakers to “join this 
brave if small club.”140 As the newspaper opined, “Capital punishment 
isn’t about justice . . . Capital punishment is about revenge.”141 In Ohio, 
former Cincinnati Mayor Thomas Luken used repeal in New Jersey as 
135 Editorial, Lawmakers Should Repeal Death Penalty, Herald News (Passaic Cnty., N.J.), Dec. 10, 
2007, at A11 (noting that the Editorial Board agreed with the New Jersey Death Penalty Study 
Commission that “capital punishment is ‘inconsistent with evolving standards of decency’”).
136 Editorial, A Just End to Death Penalty, Asbury Park Press (N.J.), Dec. 20, 2007 (noting that the 
death penalty was “too costly, risked fatal error and . . . was morally wrong”).
137 Editorial, A Long Time Coming, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2007, at A22.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Editorial, Capital Punishment Loses Ground, for Good Reasons, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 2007, 
at B6 (noting that the “best and simplest way” to spark a nationwide anti-death penalty movement 
is legislative repeal in the states); Editorial, New Jersey’s Death Penalty Switch-Off, Christian Sci. 
Monitor, Dec. 21, 2007, at 8 (“As New Jersey goes, so goes the nation?”).
140 Editorial, Abolish State’s Death Penalty, Hartford Courant, Dec. 21, 2007, at A10 [hereinafter 
Abolish State’s Death Penalty]. 
141 Id. (“An eye for an eye may be a satisfying credo, but it doesn’t heal . . . . [A]round the world, 
[the death penalty] has only fostered hatred and moral blindness.”).
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an opportunity to advocate for reconsideration of capital punishment 
in a Cincinnati Enquirer op-ed.142
Despite the positive press surrounding repeal, however, there have 
been rumblings about re-establishing the death penalty in New Jersey. 
On January 25, 2011, state Senator Robert Singer, a Republican, intro-
duced legislation that would have reinstated the death penalty in New 
Jersey for the murderers of children and police officers as well as those 
who participate in a terrorist attack that results in fatalities.143 The bill 
never cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee,144 and reaction to it across 
the state was tepid at best.145 Newspaper editorial boards spoke out 
against reinstatement,146 and an informal, online poll conducted shortly 
after the bill’s introduction revealed that fifty-six percent of New Jersey 
residents opposed reinstatement, while forty-four percent supported 
it.147 These results stand in stark contrast to a Quinnipiac University 
Polling Institute survey conducted in December 2007, as the legislature 
was debating repeal, which showed that “New Jersey residents oppose 
abolishing the death penalty 53 percent to 39 percent.”148 Thus, while 
some individual lawmakers continue to express disapproval with abo-
lition in New Jersey, their sporadic calls for reinstatement appeal to an 
ever-decreasing portion of the citizenry.149
Likewise, New Jersey courts have only rarely addressed repeal in 
their post-2007 jurisprudence. There are few reported cases in the New 
Jersey courts implicating capital punishment in the five years since 
legislative abolition, and the cases that do address the death penalty 
focus not on the constitutionality of repeal but rather on its applica-
tion to specific criminal defendants.150 The post-repeal case that most 
142 Thomas Luken, Op-Ed., Ohio Should Look at Suspending Death Penalty, Cincinnati Enquirer, 
Dec. 19, 2007, at B11 (citing DNA exonerations as proof enough that Ohio’s current capital 
punishment scheme is not working).
143 Press Release, Senator Robert Singer, Singer Introduces Bill to Reinstate Death Penalty 
in New Jersey (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.senatenj.com/index.php/singer/
singer-introduces-bill-to-reinstate-death-penalty-in-new-jersey/7839.
144 Editorial, No Reason to Bring Back Death Penalty, Herald News (Passaic Cnty., N.J.), Dec. 10, 
2011, at A13.
145 Erik Larsen, Death Penalty Debate is Revived in N.J., Asbury Park Press (N.J.), Apr. 3, 2011, 
available at http://www.lpoanj.org/news/death_penalty_debate_is_revived_in_n.j/ (“[T]here is no 
political groundswell for a return to capital punishment in New Jersey any time soon.”).
146 See No Reason to Bring Back the Death Penalty, supra note 144 (“America is not a vigilante  
country . . . . [C]ivilized societies do not execute people to punish them.”). 
147 Should N.J. Bring Back the Death Penalty?, NJ.com, http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/02/
poll_should_nj_bring_back_the.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
148 Richburg, supra note 125.
149 Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (“[It is a] well-known fact that anticrime 
legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent 
crime.”).
150 See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 2009 WL 2778035 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 3, 2009) (holding  
that abolition did not affect the denial of a capital defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief  
on other charges).
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directly addresses capital punishment in New Jersey in the wake of its 
abolition is State v. Fortin.151 In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that a defendant convicted of capital murder before abolition, but 
not yet sentenced when the legislature repealed the death penalty, 
could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole unless he were 
tried at a penalty proceeding and the jury determined the existence 
of aggravating factors and that such factors outweighed mitigating 
factors.152 In the absence of such a proceeding, the Court determined, 
the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions153 
would prohibit the imposition of a sentence “greater than the maxi-
mum non-death sentence allowed at the time of the offense: life with 
a thirty-year parole disqualifier.”154 In effect, the Court held that while 
the defendant could not automatically be sentenced to life in prison 
with no chance of parole because he had not yet been sentenced to 
death when the legislature abolished capital punishment, the State was 
free to send the defendant through the penalty phase of the trial under 
the old death penalty statute.155 If the jury at that proceeding found that 
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, the trial court could 
impose a life-without-parole sentence under the new statute; if, on the 
other hand, the jury did not find that aggravating factors outweighed 
mitigating factors, the trial court could impose no more than the maxi-
mum sentence permissible under the former statute—in this case, a life 
sentence with no eligibility for parole for thirty years.156
After the generally positive response to repeal in New Jersey, the 
question posed by editorial boards of newspapers across the country—
would abolition of capital punishment in the Garden State catalyze 
similar campaigns elsewhere?—seemed to be more one of “when,” 
than “if.” Indeed, while it took thirty-one years for the first state to 
legislatively ban the death penalty in the post-Gregg era, it took less 
than fifteen months for the second to follow New Jersey’s lead.
B. Repeal in New Mexico: Persistence Pays
New Mexico, like New Jersey, rarely used its death penalty even 
when it actually employed a capital punishment system.157 In 2001, 
New Mexico carried out its first death sentence in forty-one years when 
it executed Terry Clark for the rape and murder of 9-year-old Dena 
151 State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 2009).
152 Id. at 1140–41.
153 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”);  
N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3 (“The Legislature shall not pass any . . . ex post facto law . . . .”).
154 Fortin, 969 A.2d at 1140.
155 Id. at 1141.
156 Id.
157 Gabriela C. Guzman, Death Penalty Repeal Advances, Albuquerque J., Jan. 31, 2007, at A4.
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Lynn Gore—but only after Clark begged for more than two years to 
be executed rather than continue with his appeals process.158 The state 
then resumed its practice of non-use, executing no one in the years fol-
lowing Clark’s death.
Fittingly, then, the history of legislative repeal in New Mexico is 
full of stops and starts. In each session between 1999 and 2007, state 
Representative Gail Chasey, a Democrat, introduced legislation that 
would have abolished capital punishment.159 The first few measures 
gained little traction, but the 2005 version of the repeal bill passed 
the state House and fell short by just one vote in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.160 In February 2007, as New Jersey debated—and ulti-
mately passed—its bill abolishing capital punishment, New Mexico 
state House members once again passed a death penalty repeal bill, 
winning the support of the Santa Fe New Mexican’s editorial board in 
the process.161 As in 2005, however, the bill died in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.162
In January 2009, Rep. Chasey sponsored House Bill 285, her sixth 
death penalty repeal bill in the six legislative sessions since 1999.163 The 
bill, which, like its New Jersey counterpart, proposed replacing the 
death penalty with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
passed the state House Judiciary Committee by an 8-5 vote on February 
6.164 Less than a week later, the state House passed the abolition bill 
40-28, a nearly identical margin to the 2007 vote.165 The House vote sent 
the repeal legislation to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which killed 
similar bills in 2005 and 2007.166 On March 9, the Senate committee 
voted 6-5 to send the bill to the Senate floor, setting up the first full vote 
on abolition in that chamber since 2001, when a similar measure failed 
by a 20-21 margin.167 On the back of a strong Democratic majority, the 
Senate voted 24-18 on March 13 to pass the repeal legislation, sending 
158 Leslie Linthicum & Tania Soussan, Executed, Albuquerque J., Nov. 7, 2001, at A1.
159 See Guzman, supra note 157.
160 Steve Terrell, Death Penalty Repeal Passes State House, Santa Fe New Mexican, Feb. 13, 2007, at A6. 
161 Id.; see also Editorial, Bill, See the Boon in Death-Penalty Ban, Santa Fe New Mexican, Feb. 14, 
2007, at A7 (arguing that signing a death penalty repeal bill would bolster former New Mexico 
Governor—and presidential candidate—Bill Richardson’s resume).
162 Steve Terrell, House votes Against Capital Punishment, Santa Fe New Mexican, Feb. 12, 2009, at 
A6 [hereinafter House votes Against Capital Punishment].
163 Steve Terrell, Panel Passes Bill to Repeal Death Penalty, Santa Fe New Mexican, Feb. 7, 2009, at A5.
164 Id.
165 See House votes Against Capital Punishment, supra note 162.
166 See supra notes 160, 162 and accompanying text.
167 Steve Terrell, Death-Penalty Repeal Clears Panel, Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 10, 2009, at A1. The 
2001 repeal bill was sponsored by a state Senator and never came to a vote in the state House. S.U. 
Mahesh, 2 Lawmakers Sponsor Bills to Repeal Death Penalty, Albuquerque J., Jan. 25, 2001, at A8.
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the bill to then-Governor Bill Richardson, who had three days to act 
on the bill once he received it.168
Unlike former New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, Richardson was 
hardly an anti-death penalty crusader looking for any opportunity to 
abolish capital punishment. In fact, prior to 2009, Richardson was a 
“strong supporter” of the death penalty.169 He voted in favor of capital 
punishment as a U.S. Congressman in 1994 and said he would have 
vetoed abolition legislation during his first term as governor, from 2003 
to 2007.170 But growing evidence of DNA exonerations, prosecutorial 
misconduct, and the high cost of capital punishment had “softened” 
Richardson’s support for the practice by the time the repeal bill reached 
his desk on March 14, 2009.171 And, after three days of reflection, 
Richardson signed the legislation, formally making New Mexico the 
second state in less than two years to legislatively abolish its death pen-
alty—this after no states had done so in the thirty-one years between 
1976 and 2007.172 Calling his decision to sign the bill “the most diffi-
cult . . . of [his] political life,” Richardson expressed deep ambivalence 
regarding the death penalty even after approving the legislation.173 In 
the end, Richardson said, it was his lack of confidence in the criminal 
justice system that “compel[led him] to replace the death penalty with 
a solution that keeps society safe.”174 Notably, though, Richardson—
unlike Corzine—refused to commute the sentences of New Mexico’s 
two existing death-row inmates.175 His decision not to exercise his 
commutation power created an interesting problem for the courts—a 
problem addressed in the next Subpart, which examines the reaction to 
repeal in New Mexico.
1. Reaction to Repeal in New Mexico
The reaction to repeal in New Mexico was, in fitting with the views 
of the two states’ governors, more muted than the reaction in New 
Jersey. Prior to the Senate vote, the state’s two major newspapers were 
168 Steve Terrell, Senate Backs Death-Penalty Repeal, Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 14, 2009, at A1 
[hereinafter Senate Backs Death-Penalty Repeal].
169 Dan Boyd, Senate Passes Repeal, Leaving Decision to Richardson, Albuquerque J., Mar. 14, 2009, at A1.
170 Leslie Linthicum, Repeal Decision Not Easy for Gov., Albuquerque J., Mar. 22, 2009, at A1.
171 See Senate Backs Death-Penalty Repeal, supra note 168; see also Linthicum, supra note 170.
172 Steve Terrell, Death Penalty Repeal Is Law, Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 19, 2009, at A1 
[hereinafter Repeal Is Law].
173 Id.
174 See Richardson Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty, supra note 6; see also Governor Bill Richardson Signs 
Repeal of the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/governor-
bill-richardson-signs-repeal-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (“[T]he potential for . . . 
execution of an innocent person stands as anathema to our very sensibilities as human beings.”).
175 Repeal Is Law, supra note 172.
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split on abolition, with the Albuquerque Journal opposing repeal176 and 
the Santa Fe New Mexican supporting it, if only half-heartedly.177 New 
Mexicans themselves, while not exactly united on the subject, were 
reasonably enthusiastic in support of repeal: more than three-quarters 
of the people who contacted then-Governor Richardson’s office while 
he mulled over the legislation supported the repeal bill.178 Even after 
Richardson signed the legislation eliminating the State’s death penalty, 
though, the Santa Fe New Mexican opined that repeal “isn’t really that big 
a deal” given how infrequently the State employed the death penalty to 
begin with.179 Indeed, the newspaper observed facetiously, one of the 
“good reasons” for passing the repeal bill was to “rid[] the [Capitol] of 
perennial harping from the bleeding-heart bloc.”180 As was the case in 
New Jersey two years prior, though, the reaction outside New Mexico 
was largely supportive, with newspaper editorial boards once again 
expressing hope that legislative repeal might be contagious.181 And like 
the New Jersey vote before it, the New Mexico vote prompted at least 
one editorial board to (re)issue its own call for repeal: just as it did 
when New Jersey abandoned its death penalty in 2007, the editorial 
board of the Hartford Courant opined on April 7, 2009 that Connecticut 
Governor M. Jodi Rell “should take her cues from New Mexico” if a 
death penalty repeal bill reached her desk.182
But unlike in New Jersey, where reinstatement talk took several 
years to develop, talk of reversing the repeal began almost immedi-
ately in New Mexico—despite broad public support for abolition.183 In 
March 2011, three different bills, one in the state Senate and two in the 
176 Editorial, Preserve Death Penalty to Protect Our Officers, Albuquerque J., Mar. 1, 2009, at B2 
(expressing opposition to the repeal legislation based on concerns for the safety of correctional 
officers). But see Leslie Linthicum, Op-Ed., Governor, We Can’t Afford Another Wrong Man on Death 
Row, Albuquerque J., Mar. 15, 2009, at A1 (advocating repeal based on the idea that executing an 
innocent person is unacceptable).
177 Editorial, Death-Penalty Repeal Has Certain Appeal, Santa Fe New Mexican, Feb. 13, 2009, at A9 
(citing the possibility that innocent people will be executed as the sole justification for abolishing 
the death penalty).
178 Steve Terrell, Feedback Favors Death Penalty Repeal, Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 17, 2009, at A6 
(noting that of the 9,413 people who had contacted the Governor’s office, 7,169 favored repeal, 
while 2,244 asked the governor to veto the legislation). 
179 Editorial, Death Penalty Repealed, Hurray-Y-Yawn, Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 21, 2009, at A7.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Editorial, Another State Wises Up on Death Penalty, San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 
24, 2009 (commending New Mexico for abolishing the death penalty and imploring California 
legislators to follow suit); Editorial, Richardson Does Right, L.A. Times, Mar. 20, 2009, at A36 
(calling Richardson’s decision to sign repeal legislation “the most important act of his political 
life”); Editorial, The Cost of Capital Punishment, Bos. Globe, Apr. 15, 2009, at 14 (“[T]wo states have 
abolished the death penalty in the past three years, and 10 others have legislation pending.”).
182 Editorial, Do Away with Death Penalty, Hartford Courant, Apr. 7, 2009, at A25 [hereinafter Do 
Away with Death Penalty]. 
183 See Jason Auslander, Police Back Plan to Reverse Ban, Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 21, 2009, at 
C1 (noting that two county sheriffs and the Santa Fe police chief believed abolition “will definitely 
hurt law enforcement”).
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state House, that would have reinstated the death penalty languished 
and eventually died in their respective committees.184 In January 2012, 
new Governor Susana Martinez, a conservative Republican, asked 
New Mexico lawmakers to consider a reinstatement bill.185 In response, 
state Representative Dennis Kintigh, the same Republican who intro-
duced both reinstatement bills in 2011, introduced another bill to bring 
the death penalty back to New Mexico.186 Like its 2011 predecessors, 
however, Kintigh’s 2012 reinstatement bill failed in a House committee 
chaired by Rep. Chasey, the original sponsor of the repeal legislation.187 
Thus, while some conservative New Mexico Republicans continue to 
push for reinstatement, as long as Democrats control both houses of 
the legislature and as long as the public continues to support abolition, 
death penalty repeal legislation appears safe in the state.
New Mexico’s repeal statute, like New Jersey’s, applied only pro-
spectively; section six of the bill explicitly states that, “[t]he provisions 
of this act apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009.”188 Unlike 
former New Jersey Governor Corzine, however, former New Mexico 
Governor Richardson refused to commute the death sentences of the 
two inmates already on New Mexico’s death row when he signed his 
state’s repeal legislation.189 This in itself did not create a problem for 
courts—Richardson’s decision not to commute the death sentences of 
Robert Fry and Timothy Allen was perfectly constitutional, if a little 
unsettling—but it did raise questions about the permissible punish-
ment for Michael Paul Astorga, who killed a police officer in 2006 but 
was not convicted of capital murder until June 2010—long after the 
repeal legislation came into effect in July 2009—and whose sentence 
has yet to be determined.190 Because Astorga committed his death-
eligible crime before July 1, 2009, the State sought the death penalty 
against him.191 Astorga’s attorney argued that abolition meant his cli-
ent could not receive a death sentence, but the New Mexico Supreme 
Court disagreed, allowing the penalty phase of Astorga’s trial to go 
forward.192 Nonetheless, the Court permitted Astorga to discuss the 
184 Dan Boyd, Bid to Reinstate Death Penalty Stalls, Albuquerque J., Mar. 10, 2011, at A6; Matthew 
Reichbach, Death Penalty Reinstatement Dies in Committee, N.M. Indep. (Mar. 9, 2011, 08:25 AM), 
http://newmexicoindependent.com/69203/death-penalty-reinstatement-dies-in-committee.
185 Milan Simonich, Governor: Reinstate Death Penalty, El Paso Times (Jan. 20, 2012, 02:17 AM), 
http://elpasotimes.typepad.com/newmexico/2012/01/governor-reinstate-death-penalty.html.
186 See id.
187 Milan Simonich, Sponsor Says Proposals to Reinstate Death Penalty Have No Chance to Succeed, 
Alamogordo Daily News (N.M.) (Feb. 4, 2012, 04:36 PM), http://www.alamogordonews.com/
ci_19894621.
188 2009 N.M. Laws, ch. 11, § 6.
189 Repeal Is Law, supra note 172.
190 Astrid Galvan, High Court: Astorga Case Can Go On, Albuquerque J., Feb. 5, 2011, at D1.
191 Id.
192 Scott Sandlin, Death Penalty Case Goes Forward, Albuquerque J., Sept. 2, 2011, at A1.
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repeal in his argument and to introduce new evidence on the same 
theory.193 The Court refused, however, to decide explicitly “whether 
the 2009 death penalty repeal means Astorga can’t be subject to capital 
punishment.”194 Thus, while it remains an open question whether capi-
tal defendants who committed their crimes prior to repeal may receive 
death sentences in New Mexico, the state’s highest court has indicated 
a willingness to abide by the letter of the law in considering prospec-
tive repeal purely prospective, rather than giving it a form of de facto 
retroactivity as some commentators believed was likely.195
As explained later in this Part, the prospective-only nature of death 
penalty repeal statutes—which the New Mexico Supreme Court rig-
idly applied to Michael Paul Astorga—has proved to be a controversial 
compromise for death penalty repeal advocates in other states.196 Now, 
though, this Article turns to repeal in Illinois, which followed a slightly 
different route than repeal in New Jersey and New Mexico.
C. Illinois Officially Abandons Its  
Death Penalty After an 11-Year Moratorium
Unlike New Jersey and New Mexico, which employed the death 
penalty rarely even before it was repealed, Illinois executed ninety-eight 
people between 1928, when the State took over execution duties from 
county officials, and 1972, when the U.S. Supreme Court temporarily 
halted capital punishment nationwide in Furman.197 After a fourteen-year 
hiatus following the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty in Gregg, Illinois executed twelve more 
people between 1990 and 1999.198 Then, suddenly, eleven months after 
Anthony Porter came within fifty hours of his execution before walking 
out of jail a free man and ten months after Andrew Kokoraleis died 
by lethal injection, former Illinois Governor George Ryan imposed a 
moratorium on executions in the State.199 Noting that thirteen people 
on Illinois’ death row had been exonerated since 1977, Ryan stated that 
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Cf. Testimony of Quinnipiac University School of Law Civil Justice Clinic in Support of Raised Bill 
No. 280 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 14, 2012) (noting that death penalty supporters 
opposed repeal in Connecticut based on the argument that “a prospective-only death penalty 
will be interpreted by the Connecticut Supreme Court to retroactively nullify existing death 
sentences”).
196 See infra Part II.D.
197 Tim Novak, Gacy Marks 100th State Execution, Joliet Prisons, http://www.joliet.com/prisons/
executed/gacy5.html.
198 Execution Database, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
views-executions (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
199 Press Release, Governor George Ryan, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will 
Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000), available at http://www.
illinois.gov/pressreleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectid=3&recnum=359.
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he would not approve another execution until the Illinois Commission 
on Capital Punishment, whose members he appointed in March 2000, 
gave him its recommendations.200
In April 2002, the Commission proposed a number of changes to 
Illinois’ capital punishment system but did not include a formal recom-
mendation to scrap the death penalty altogether, despite the support 
of a majority of Commission members for abolition.201 Nonetheless, 
the Commission ultimately concluded that it “cannot guarantee that 
the innocent will no longer be wrongly condemned.”202 After the 
Illinois legislature refused to work with Ryan to implement some of 
the Commission’s proposed reforms, the former governor took drastic 
action: on January 11, 2003, with two days left in his term, he com-
muted the death sentences of all 164 inmates on the state’s death row, 
declaring that, “[t]he Illinois capital punishment system is broken.”203
With the moratorium still in place nearly eight years later, Illinois 
House members voted 60-54 on January 6, 2011 to pass legislation to 
formally abolish the State’s death penalty.204 The state Senate approved 
the abolition bill five days later by a vote of 35-22, sending it to Governor 
Pat Quinn, a Democrat who—like former New Mexico Governor Bill 
Richardson—long supported the death penalty.205 After almost two 
months of deliberation, Quinn signed the repeal bill into law on March 
9, 2011, making Illinois the third state in five years to legislatively abol-
ish its death penalty.206 Like Richardson, Quinn called abolition “the 
most difficult decision he has made as governor”; he cited the unac-
ceptable risk that an innocent person could be executed as his primary 
motivation for supporting repeal.207 Unlike Richardson, though, Quinn 
commuted to life in prison without parole the sentences of the fifteen 
men sentenced to death in Illinois since former Governor Ryan issued 
his blanket clemency order in January 2003.208
200 Id.
201 Steve Mills & Christi Parsons, Ryan’s Panel Urges Fixes in Death Penalty, Chi. Trib.,  
Apr. 15, 2002, at 1.
202 Id.
203 Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Ryan Commutes 164 Death Sentences to Life in Prison Without 
Parole, Chi. Trib., Jan. 12, 2003, at 1.
204 Ray Long & Todd Wilson, House votes to Repeal Illinois’ Death Penalty, Chi. Trib., Jan. 7, 2011, at 6.
205 Ray Long, Todd Wilson & Ted Gregory, Historic Measure Awaits Quinn’s Signature, Chi. Trib., 
Jan. 12, 2011, at 1 (noting that Quinn said while campaigning for the governor’s office in fall 2010 
that he “supports capital punishment when applied carefully and fairly”).
206 Steve Mills, Illinois Bans Death Penalty, Chi. Trib., Mar. 10, 2011, at 1.
207 Illinois Death Penalty Abolished, Huffington Post, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/03/08/illinois-death-penalty-ab_n_833250.html.
208 Id.
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1. Reaction to Repeal in Illinois
Given the 11-year moratorium in place before formal repeal, reac-
tion to abolition in Illinois—which effectively just cemented the status 
quo—was more subdued than it was in either New Jersey or New 
Mexico. But in the weeks leading up to Governor Quinn’s signing of 
the bill, and in the days immediately following it, both major Chicago 
newspapers wholeheartedly supported repeal. In late February 2011, 
with Quinn still sitting on the abolition bill more than six weeks after he 
received it from the state legislature, the Chicago Tribune—whose edito-
rial board long advocated death penalty reform209—urged the governor 
to sign the repeal legislation, writing that “the [capital punishment] 
system can’t be trusted.”210 The day after Quinn signed the bill, the 
Tribune called his decision a “courageous step” that was “worthy of 
significant, if sober, celebration.”211 The Chicago Sun-Times joined the 
Tribune in commending Quinn for repealing capital punishment in the 
State, writing that, “Illinois has . . . taken a step that was as necessary as 
it was emotionally difficult.”212
Despite overwhelming support in the editorial pages of the state’s 
two biggest newspapers, however, repeal in Illinois was not uniformly 
popular. Unlike in New Jersey and New Mexico, where voters backed 
repeal in relatively large numbers, a majority of Illinois citizens still 
supported the death penalty in October 2010.213 And just eight days 
after Governor Quinn signed the repeal bill, state Representative Dennis 
Reboletti, a Republican, managed to win House committee approval 
of two bills that would have reinstated the death penalty in Illinois 
for a narrow subset of crimes.214 In April and May 2011, however, the 
bills were re-referred to state House committees, where they have 
languished since, having yet to come to a vote in the full chamber.215 
Thus, as long as Democrats remain in control of the Illinois General 
Assembly, death penalty reinstatement appears unlikely to gain any 
traction in the state.
209 Editorial, Fix This Broken System, Chi. Trib., Feb. 1, 2000, at 12 (calling former Governor Ryan’s 
decision to impose a moratorium on executions “wise and welcome”).
210 Editorial, “Sign It,” Chi. Trib., Feb. 28, 2011, at 14 (analogizing Quinn’s decision to former 
New Mexico Governor Richardson’s and noting the many similarities between the two men with 
respect to their views on the death penalty).
211 Editorial, The End of Death Row, Chi. Trib., Mar. 10, 2011, at 22 [hereinafter The End of Death Row] 
(“Illinois is better off without the death penalty.”).
212 Editorial, Death Penalty Repeal a victory for Justice, Chi. Sun-Times, Mar. 10, 2011, at 20 (“The 
struggle for justice is one that will never end. But with his signature, Quinn brought us one step 
closer to that ideal.”).
213 See The End of Death Row, supra note 211 (citing a poll which found that 56 percent of Illinois 
voters wanted the moratorium on executions lifted).
214 Todd Wilson, House Panel Approves Bill Reinstating Death Penalty, Chi. Trib., Mar. 18, 2011, at 16.
215 H.B. 1519, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011); H.B. 1738, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.  
(Ill. 2011).
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Finally, though Illinois courts consistently upheld death sentences 
during the 11-year moratorium between 2000 and 2011—indeed, fifteen 
defendants were sent to death row between 2003 and 2011 alone216—
there is a dearth of judicial decisions implicating interesting questions 
regarding capital punishment in the wake of legislative repeal.
D. Connecticut Scraps Its Death Penalty  
in the Wake of a Brutal Triple Homicide
Connecticut, like both New Jersey and New Mexico, seldom 
carried out its death penalty in the past half century. Between 1960 and 
2012, the state executed only one person—Michael Ross in 2005—and 
only after the condemned man waived his right to appeal and effec-
tively begged to die.217 Perhaps naturally, then, the repeal process in 
Connecticut began years before it culminated with abolition in April 
2012. Indeed, in May 2009, the General Assembly actually sent a bill 
that would have eradicated capital punishment to then-Governor M. 
Jodi Rell.218 The legislation, which would have applied prospectively, 
won only narrow support in the state Senate, but enjoyed a consider-
ably stronger backing in the House.219 Nonetheless, Governor Rell, a 
Republican and a lifelong supporter of capital punishment, vowed to 
veto the bill as soon as it hit her desk.220 In a statement, she said she 
believed the death penalty was “warranted” for “heinous” crimes that 
are “fundamentally revolting to our humanity.”221 As promised, Rell 
vetoed the bill, and the tenuous support for abolition in the state Senate 
dashed all hopes for a veto override.222
Less than three years later, though, with a Democrat, Dannel P. 
Malloy, having replaced Rell at the Governor’s desk, repeal advo-
cates tried again. And on April 11, 2012, the Connecticut House of 
Representatives voted 86-62 for a bill to repeal capital punishment, 
sending the legislation to Malloy six days after the state Senate voted 
20-16 for abolition.223 Malloy, who in the early 1980s served as an 
Assistant District Attorney in Brooklyn, supported the death penalty 
as a young man.224 But his experiences as a prosecutor influenced his 
216 See Illinois Death Penalty Abolished, supra note 207.
217 See Altimari, supra note 8.




222 Christopher Keating, Rell vetoes Bill to Abolish Capital Punishment, Hartford Courant, June 6, 2009.
223 Daniela Altimari, After Wrenching Debate, Senate Backs Repeal, Hartford Courant, Apr. 6, 2012, at 
A1 [hereinafter Altimari, Senate] (reporting on the 20-16 Senate vote); Daniela Altimari, House votes 
for Repeal, Hartford Courant, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Altimari, House] (reporting on the 
86-62 House vote).
224 Altimari, supra note 8.
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views on capital punishment, and by the time the repeal bill reached 
Malloy’s desk, it was a foregone conclusion that he would sign it.225 
Indeed, on April 25, 2012, two weeks after he received the legisla-
tion from the General Assembly, Governor Malloy signed it, making 
Connecticut the fourth state since 2007 to eradicate its death penalty 
by statute.226 Echoing Illinois Governor Pat Quinn, Malloy cited the 
unacceptable risk of executing an innocent person as a primary justifi-
cation for abolishing capital punishment: “Doing away with the death 
penalty,” he said just before he signed the bill, “[is] the only way to 
ensure it [will] not be unfairly imposed.”227 And yet, like former New 
Mexico Governor Bill Richardson—and unlike former New Jersey 
Governor Jon Corzine and Illinois Governor Pat Quinn—Malloy did 
not commute the death sentences of the eleven men currently on death 
row, who are still facing execution for their crimes despite passage of 
the abolition bill.228 Unlike Richardson, however, Malloy did not have 
a choice; the Connecticut Constitution imposes temporal limits on the 
governor’s commutation powers, providing only for the authority to 
issue individual stays of execution that expire at the end of the fol-
lowing legislative session.229 Ultimately, only the Board of Pardons and 
Paroles has full authority to commute death sentences in Connecticut.230
Abolition in Connecticut comes at an interesting time in the state’s 
history with capital punishment, and that history may have something 
to do with the prospective-only nature of the bill. In July 2007, Steven 
Hayes and Joshua Komisarjevsky savagely beat Dr. William Petit and 
brutally raped and murdered his wife and two daughters.231 The two 
men were subsequently convicted of capital murder and sentenced to 
death.232 There was broad public support in Connecticut for the death 
sentences and the Hartford Courant called the murders “possibly the 
most widely publicized crime in the state’s history.”233 It is perhaps not 
225 See Altimari, House, supra note 223 (noting that Governor Malloy has “pledged to sign” the bill).
226 Altimari, supra note 8.
227 Id.
228 Editorial, Repealed, Sort Of, Hartford Courant, Apr. 8, 2012, at C2 [hereinafter Repealed, Sort 
Of] (noting that under the “half-baked [repeal] bill,” the 11 men currently on death row would still 
face execution).
229 See Conn. Const. art. IV, § 13 (“The governor shall have power to grant reprieves after 
conviction . . . until the end of the next session of the general assembly, and no longer.”); Palka 
v. Walker, 198 A. 265, 266 (Conn. 1938) (“A reprieve properly granted during a session of the 
Legislature may run until the end of the first session which thereafter convenes.”).
230 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-130a (West 2007) (“[C]ommutations from the penalty of death 
shall be vested in the Board of Pardons and Paroles.”).
231 See generally Alison Leigh Cowan & Stacey Stowe, Suspects in Deadly Home Invasion Had Been 
Roommates, N.Y. Times, July 25, 2007, at B1 (describing the crime).
232 Alaine Griffin, Judge Sentences Komisarjevsky for Petit Murders, Hartford Courant, Jan. 28, 2012, at 
A1. Alaine Griffin, Hayes Faces Execution for Cheshire Murders, Hartford Courant, Nov. 9, 2010, at A1.
233 Matthew Kauffman, Lawyers Say Impartial Jury Can Be Impaneled, Hartford Courant, Nov. 10, 
2010, at A1.
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surprising, then, that Connecticut voters overwhelmingly opposed 
abolition in March 2012 even as the General Assembly debated the 
repeal legislation.234 Indeed, public support for the death penalty 
actually rose from fifty-nine percent in 2005 to sixty-three percent 
in 2007, after the triple murders.235 It rose again, to sixty-five per-
cent, in 2010.236 Thus, Connecticut lawmakers may have thought a 
retroactive death penalty repeal bill too compassionate for Hayes 
and Komisarjevsky, especially given Dr. Petit’s fierce and outspo-
ken opposition to repeal.237 The prospective-only bill that Governor 
Malloy signed, then, was likely a product of compromise, with legis-
lators attempting to strike a balance between wanting to punish those 
already on death row, particularly Hayes and Komisarjevsky, and 
wanting to scrap the death penalty altogether.238
1. Reaction to Repeal in Connecticut
Because repeal in Connecticut happened so recently, reaction to 
abolition there has been more limited in scope than in any of the other 
three states to legislatively eradicate their death penalties since 2007. 
But the reaction so far, however limited it may be, indicates that pub-
lic opinion on abolition is as divided as the state Senators who only 
narrowly supported repeal.239 For years before April 2012, the state’s 
largest newspaper strongly supported abolition; indeed, in the wake 
of repeal in both New Jersey and New Mexico, the Hartford Courant 
was among the loudest and most prominent of the newspaper editorial 
boards calling on its state’s leaders to follow suit.240 And when repeal 
finally did come to Connecticut, the newspaper criticized the “half-
baked,” prospective-only bill for “continu[ing] the state’s vacillation 
234 Daniela Altimari, Repeal Advances but Foes Cite Public Support for Execution, Hartford Courant, 
Mar. 21, 2012, at A1 (noting that a poll conducted between March 14-19, 2012 found that 
Connecticut voters disapproved of repeal by 62-31 percent, though the margin fell to 48-43 when 
voters were asked to consider life without parole as the alternative to death).
235 Daniela Altimari & Christopher Keating, 67% OK with Death Penalty, Hartford Courant, Mar. 
11, 2011, at A1.
236 Id.
237 See Alaine Griffin, Petit Talks About God, Fate, Luck, Hartford Courant, Dec. 10, 2010, at A1 
(noting that Petit compared the repeal debate to “death by 1,000 paper cuts”). Prospective-only 
bills have been something of a boon, though, in the minds of some abolitionists, who view such 
legislation as a useful bargaining chip in the fight to eradicate the death penalty in the face of 
persistent opposition. Interview with Colleen Cunningham, supra note 22. Such bills provide a 
means of achieving abolition, albeit in an imperfect form, but they also provide closure for victims’ 
families who fought for—and received—death sentences for the killers of their loved ones. Id.
238 See Alaine Griffin, Inmate Challenges New Law, Hartford Courant, June 4, 2012, at A1.
239 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
240 See Abolish State’s Death Penalty, supra note 140 (advocating for repeal in 2007); Do Away with 
Death Penalty, supra note 182 (same for 2009).
 Legislation & Policy Brief 95
over the death penalty, repealing it but not really.”241 And yet, the 
Connecticut citizenry—like that in Illinois—was far less enthusiastic 
in its support for abolition; a Quinnipiac University poll released the 
same day that Governor Malloy signed the repeal legislation showed 
that “nearly two-thirds of Connecticut voters support capital punish-
ment” in the abstract, though that number dropped to forty-six percent 
when respondents were asked to choose between the death penalty 
and life in prison with no possibility of parole.242
Given the repeal legislation’s narrow margin in the state Senate, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the bill’s opponents wasted little time mak-
ing their distaste for abolition known. Indeed, some legislators, includ-
ing Republican Representative Al Adinolfi, indicated the very day that 
Governor Malloy signed the repeal bill that they would soon start a 
drive to reinstate capital punishment.243 These “repeal the repeal” cam-
paigns have yet to produce any proposed legislation or make any head-
way, however, in the Democratically-controlled General Assembly.
Connecticut courts have also begun to grapple with questions about 
the constitutionality of the prospective-only nature of the repeal legis-
lation. In particular, pending suits by two of the eleven condemned 
men currently awaiting execution on death row could prompt the 
Connecticut Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of pro-
spective-only repeal.244 The first of these suits was brought by Richard 
Roszkowski, who murdered three people, including a nine-year-old 
girl, in September 2006.245 Roszkowski was convicted of capital murder 
and sentenced to death in 2009, but a judge later dismissed his sentence 
and ordered a new penalty phase due to a faulty jury instruction.246 At 
a pretrial hearing in May 2012, Roszkowski indicated that he would 
petition the Connecticut Supreme Court to determine whether the pro-
spective-only nature of death penalty repeal violates his constitutional 
rights and whether he can properly be sentenced to death after passage 
of the repeal legislation, even if he was convicted before abolition.247 
The second suit is by Eduardo Santiago, who was convicted of—and 
sentenced to die for—participating in a murder-for-hire scheme in 
241 See Repealed, Sort Of, supra note 228 (calling the bill “cause for consternation,” saying it “should 
be abolished entirely,” and predicting expensive litigation resulting from challenges by the eleven 
men currently on death row).
242 Altimari, supra note 8; see also Repealed, Sort Of, supra note 228 (mentioning an earlier poll 
showing similar results).
243 Altimari, supra note 8.
244 See Griffin, supra note 238 (discussing the cases of Eduardo Santiago and Richard Roszkowski).
245 Alaine Griffin, Triple Murderer Awaits New Penalty Phase, Hartford Courant, May 31, 2012, at A1.
246 Id.
247 Id. In this way, Roszkowski’s case brings to mind that of Michael Paul Astorga in New Mexico. 
See supra Part II.B.1.
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2005.248 Santiago appealed his sentence to the Connecticut Supreme 
Court based on the withholding of certain state records pertaining to 
his family history—records that show “abuse, neglect and abandon-
ment” and paint a picture of Santiago’s “horrific childhood.”249 Having 
determined that the trial court “improperly failed to disclose certain 
documents from the [State’s] file that potentially would have given the 
jury a broader and more comprehensive picture of the defendant’s fam-
ily history to consider as a mitigating factor,” the Connecticut Supreme 
Court overturned Santiago’s death sentence and unanimously ordered 
a new penalty phase.250 The Justices, did not, however, take a stance 
on the impact of the death penalty repeal legislation on Santiago’s 
case despite his motion seeking oral argument on—and permission to 
file briefs addressing—that constitutional question.251 While Santiago 
argued in his motion that abolition “raises serious questions about the 
validity” of his death sentence,252 the Court delayed its decision on that 
issue until a later date.253 Thus, as in New Mexico, it remains an open 
question in Connecticut whether condemned capital defendants who 
have earned new post-repeal penalty phases may constitutionally be 
executed for their crimes.
III. Forging a “National Consensus”: The State of Repeal Today
So where does repeal stand today? With four states having legis-
latively abolished their death penalties since 2007, repeal is certainly 
gaining steam nationwide. But how many more states, if any, must 
pass legislation to repeal capital punishment before the U.S. Supreme 
Court has no choice but to determine that a “national consensus” has 
developed against its imposition altogether? This Part examines the 
prospects for abolition in a number of other states before offering some 
thoughts on what the future of the death penalty may look like in the 
United States.
A. Repeal Prospects in Other States
Repeal campaigns, at their various stages, are underway in several 
other states, including Maryland—whose Democratic governor, Martin 
248 Alaine Griffin, Death Sentence Tossed, New Penalty Phase Ordered, Hartford Courant, June 4, 
2012, at A1.
249 Id.; see also State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 119–20 (2012).
250 Santiago, 305 Conn. at 215; see also Griffin, supra note 248.
251 Santiago, 305 Conn. at 307 n.167 (“[T]hese constitutional issues would be more appropriately 
addressed in the context of postjudgment motions.”).
252 Griffin, supra note 248.
253 Santiago, 305 Conn. at 307 n.167.
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O’Malley, has called capital punishment “inherently unjust”254—and 
Nebraska, where abolition bills were introduced but killed early in 
2012.255 Repeal legislation is also under consideration in Montana and 
Colorado, which both recently debated, but ultimately decided against, 
abolition.256 Grassroots organizations in Delaware and South Dakota 
are pushing for repeal,257 while anti-death penalty coalitions have also 
formed in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, though abolition advo-
cates acknowledge that the political climate in those states will make 
repeal difficult.258
Meanwhile, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, a Democrat, declared 
a moratorium on executions in his state on November 22, 2011, say-
ing that he “simply cannot participate in something [he] believe[s] to 
be morally wrong.”259 Just shy of one year later, state Representative 
Mitch Greenlick, a Democrat from Portland, announced that he would 
introduce a bill in the 2013 legislative session to propose a constitu-
tional amendment to replace Oregon’s death penalty with a sentence 
of life in prison without parole.260 If passed by legislators, the proposed 
amendment would go before Oregon voters—who must approve con-
stitutional amendments by a simple majority—in November 2014.261 
Shortly after Rep. Greenlick’s announcement, the editorial board of the 
state’s largest newspaper, The Oregonian, enthusiastically supported 
placing such a bill in front of voters.262
And in New Hampshire, the November 2012 election of Democratic 
Governor Maggie Hassan has breathed new life into the abolition cam-
paign in that state—which has suffered setbacks in the form of vetoes 
(or veto threats) at the hands of two of its last three governors—whose 
supporters now feel abolition in New Hampshire is an “inevitability.”263 
254 John Wagner, As O’Malley Eyes Repeal, Md. Death Row Remains at ‘Impasse,’ Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 
2012, at C1.
255 Recent Legislative Activity, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-
legislative-activity (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
256 Interview with Colleen Cunningham, supra note 22.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Kim Murphy, Oregon’s Governor Issues Moratorium on Death Penalty, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2011, 
at A15.
260 See Helen Jung, Oregon Legislator Prepares Death-Penalty Repeal Bill, as Anniversary of Execution 
Moratorium Approaches, Oregonian, Nov. 20, 2012, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/
index.ssf/2012/11/oregon_legislator_prepares_dea.html.
261 See id.
262 See Editorial, Oregon’s Life-or-Death vote, Oregonian, Nov. 26, 2012, available at http://www.
oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/11/oregons_life-or-death_vote.html (“Oregon voters need  
a say in this profound question of justice.”).
263 See Joseph G. Cote, Death Penalty Opponents Hopeful New Crop of Lawmakers Will Support 
Abolishing Law, Nashua Telegraph, Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://www.nashuatelegraph.
com/news/983748-469/death-penalty-opponents-hopeful-new-crop-of.html (noting that state 
Representative Steve Vaillancourt, a Republican, has submitted a “legislative services request,  
the precursor to a House bill, to abolish the death penalty again this year”).
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Indeed, Governor-elect Hassan has publicly stated that she opposes 
capital punishment “as a matter of personal conscience and faith.”264
The news is not uniformly good for abolition proponents, however. 
In California, home to the nation’s largest death row,265 a coalition called 
Taxpayers for Justice placed a death penalty repeal initiative on the bal-
lot in November 2012.266 Proposition 34, as the measure was officially 
known, would have replaced the death penalty with a sentence of life 
in prison without the possibility of parole and would have commuted 
the sentences of the more than 720 inmates currently on California’s 
death row.267 Despite raising at least $4.6 million in support of the 
measure (compared to a mere $240,000 raised by opposition groups),268 
however, repeal supporters failed to muster enough support to pass 
their initiative, which lost by nearly 500,000 votes—or 52-48 percent.269 
Indeed, polls in California have shown strong and consistent support 
for capital punishment over the years.270
Finally, before discussing the future of the death penalty in the 
United States viewed through the lens of legislative repeal, it is worth 
noting that although it was technically the New York Court of Appeals 
that issued the final word on the death penalty in 2004,271 abolition in 
the Empire State was more the product of legislative acquiescence than 
of judicial fiat. After the Court determined that the state’s death pen-
alty statute contained an unconstitutional jury deadlock instruction,272 
it explicitly stated that, “this defect in the existing statute can only be 
cured by a new deadlock instruction from the Legislature.”273 Rather 
than cure the unconstitutional provision of its death penalty statute, 
however, the New York Legislature ultimately rejected a revised death 
264 Tricia L. Nadolny, With Hassan in Office, Death Penalty’s Days Could Be Numbered, Concord 
Monitor, Nov. 25, 2012, available at http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/2941576-95/
death-penalty-repeal-addison.
265 California — Fact Sheet, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/california-1 
(last visited July 22, 2012). 
266 See Steven Harmon, California voters to Have Say on Taxes, State Budgeting Process, Crime and 
Justice, San Jose Mercury News, July 14, 2012; Recent Legislative Activity, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislative-activity (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
267 See Harmon, supra note 266.
268 See Sam Stanton, Proposition 34: Repealing the Death Penalty, Sacramento Bee, Oct. 7, 2012, at 3A 
(reporting dollar figures as of October 7, 2012).
269 See Cal. Sec’y State, State Ballot Measures 69 (2012), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2012-general/15-ballot-measures.pdf.
270 See Harmon, supra note 266; Maura Dolan, voters to Have Say on Death Penalty, L.A. Times, Apr. 
24, 2012, at AA1 (“California voters have historically favored capital punishment, passing several 
measures over the last few decades to . . . expand the number of crimes punishable by death.”).
271 See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) (invalidating the death penalty in New York 
but leaving intact provisions of the law that authorize a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for defendants convicted of first-degree murder).
272 Id. at 344 (“[T]he jury deadlock instruction prescribed in [New York Criminal Procedure Law 
§ 400.27(10)] is unconstitutional under article I, § 6 of the State Constitution.”).
273 Id.
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penalty bill supported by then-Governor George E. Pataki.274 After the 
Republican-controlled state Senate overwhelmingly approved a legislative 
fix for the problem identified by the New York Court of Appeals in People 
v. Lavalle, the Democratic-controlled state Assembly killed the legislation 
in an 11-7 committee vote on April 12, 2005.275 That vote eradicated capital 
punishment in New York—which as of 2005 had executed 695 people, 
more than any state but Texas—once and for all, and was popular among 
residents, a “sizeable majority” of whom indicated in polls that they 
preferred a sentence of life in prison with no chance of parole to a death 
sentence for convicted murderers.276 Thus, while it was a judicial decision 
that catalyzed the repeal process in New York, it was a legislative act that 
hammered the final nail in the coffin of the death penalty in the state.
B. What Constitutes a “National Consensus”?:  
The Future of the American Death Penalty
Anti-death penalty advocates readily acknowledge that legisla-
tive repeal is politically infeasible in a number of states.277 But, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Enmund v. Florida, the legislative position of 
the states need not be “‘wholly unanimous’” to justify abandoning the 
practice because it runs counter to “evolving standards of decency.”278 
Rather, the legislative evidence need only “weigh[] on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment” for the Supreme Court to jettison it.279 
Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Atkins, “[i]t is not so much the 
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the 
direction of change.”280 With regard to legislative repeal of the death 
penalty, the direction of change is clear: five states have abolished 
their death penalties since 2004—four of them by statute and the other, 
New York, by a hybrid judicial/legislative process.281 Meanwhile, no 
state has permanently reinstituted the death penalty since Kansas in 
1994,282 though that state has not actually executed anyone since 1965.283 
Thus, in the years since repeal legislation began to take hold, there has 




277 Interview with Colleen Cunningham, supra note 22 (noting that states like Texas and Oklahoma 
are very unlikely to voluntarily abolish their death penalties).
278 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787, 792-93 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 
(1977)).
279 Id. at 793.
280 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
281 See supra Parts II, III.A.
282 Kansas — Fact Sheet, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/kansas-1 (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2012). Notably, this does not include New York, which reinstated its death penalty 
in 1995 but subsequently abolished it in 2007.
283 Id.
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been a “complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the 
power to conduct . . . executions.”284 And in none of those states that 
have legislatively abolished capital punishment has a reinstatement 
bill actually come to a full vote.285
Here, we can draw another parallel to the Court’s reasoning 
in Atkins. In that case, the Court viewed the fact that executions of 
mentally retarded defendants were “uncommon” in those states that 
nominally allowed for the practice in 2002 as a factor counseling for a 
finding of a “national consensus” against such executions.286 Similarly, 
executions are rare in many states that currently permit capital punish-
ment: thirteen of the thirty-three states that still have a death penalty on 
their books have executed fewer than eight people since 1976, when the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment 
in Gregg.287 Two of these states, in fact, have not executed anyone in more 
than forty-five years.288 An additional five have not executed anyone 
this century.289 In many of these states, therefore, there is, as there was 
in Atkins, “little need to pursue legislation barring . . . execution[s].”290 
And yet this does not mean that a “national consensus” has not devel-
oped, or is not developing, against capital punishment altogether. For 
anti-death penalty advocates, therefore, nationwide repeal may now 
be a question of “when” and not “if”—that, at least, is the hope.291
The Supreme Court has never provided a clear definition of what 
constitutes a “national consensus” for Eighth Amendment purposes; 
its decisions involving such an inquiry thus provide little guidance on 
the number of states required to establish a consensus.292 For example, 
284 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16.
285 See supra Part II.
286 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
287 These states are: Utah (seven executions since 1976); Tennessee (six); Maryland and Washington 
(five each); Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania (three each); Idaho and Oregon 
(two each); and Colorado, South Dakota, and Wyoming (one each). Number of Executions by State 
and Region Since 1976, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-
executions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
288 These states are Kansas (last execution in 1965) and New Hampshire (1939). Kansas — Fact Sheet, 
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/kansas-1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); 
New Hampshire — Fact Sheet, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-
hampshire-1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
289 These states are Colorado (last execution in 1997), Nebraska (1997), Oregon (1997), 
Pennsylvania (1999), and Wyoming (1992). Jurisdictions with No Recent Executions, Death Penalty 
Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/jurisdictions-no-recent-executions (last visited Apr. 
15, 2012).
290 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
291 Interview with Colleen Cunningham, supra note 22.
292 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that thirteen states constitute a “national 
consensus”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (forty-four states); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (thirty states); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (thirty states); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988) (thirty-two states); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (forty-two states). But see, e.g., Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that neither twenty-two nor twenty-five states are enough to 
constitute a “national consensus”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (sixteen states not enough).
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in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court determined that the laws of 
a mere thirteen states constituted a “national consensus” against the 
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment with no chance for parole 
on a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide.293 But in Stanford 
v. Kentucky, the Court determined that the laws of as many as twenty-
two or even twenty-five states did not constitute a “national consensus” 
against the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders aged 
sixteen or seventeen at the time of their crimes.294 The cases for which 
the Court has canvassed the state legislatures to ferret out the existence 
of a “national consensus” therefore do not provide a target number or 
a clear line for death penalty abolition advocates.
Such advocates, for their part, do not believe that a simple majority 
of states is enough to constitute a “national consensus” when it comes to 
the death penalty.295 Given the Supreme Court’s “national consensus” 
precedent, they are probably right.296 What, then, might be a reasonable 
target for abolitionists? Excluding Graham as an outlier, in each case in 
which the Court has looked to state laws to determine the presence of a 
“national consensus,” it has required at least thirty states before it will 
find the existence of such a consensus.297 If thirty is the magic number, 
then, an additional thirteen states would have to eradicate their death 
penalties to force the Court’s hand. Another option is borne out of the 
Constitution itself: perhaps three-quarters of the states must abolish 
their death penalties before the Supreme Court will determine that a 
“national consensus” exists against capital punishment altogether.298 
If the Court were to use this metric, an additional twenty-one states 
would have to do away with their capital punishment schemes to con-
stitute a “national consensus.”
A determination that a “national consensus” has developed against 
a particular punishment does not, however, necessarily sound the 
death knell for that punishment. Indeed, the Supreme Court affirmed 
in Graham v. Florida that while such consensus is entitled to “great 
weight,” it is “not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel 
and unusual” and that “‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
remains [the Court’s] responsibility.’”299 To carry out this task, 
the Court refers to its “own understanding and interpretation of the 
293 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
294 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371–72.
295 Interview with Colleen Cunningham, supra note 22. 
296 See cases cited supra note 292.
297 See cases cited supra note 292.
298 Cf. U.S. Const. art. V (requiring ratification by “the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States” before a Constitutional amendment is valid).
299 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (2005)) (some internal quotation 
marks omitted).
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Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”300 Given 
the subjectivity involved in defining the contours of the Eighth 
Amendment, then, any attempt to predict what might convince 
the Supreme Court to make such a sweeping ruling regarding the 
constitutionality of capital punishment must be viewed with much 
skepticism.
Conclusion
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia now prohibit execu-
tions for all crimes.301 Five of them have officially abandoned capital 
punishment since 2004. How many more must abolish the death pen-
alty, and how soon, for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine that a 
“national consensus” has developed against its use? How much longer 
until the Supreme Court agrees with Justice Blackmun that “the death 
penalty experiment has failed”?302 While there are few states in which 
legislative repeal is imminent, the tide is certainly building, and the 
Supreme Court will likely soon have to take its hardest look since the 
1970s at the constitutionality of capital punishment in this country.
300 Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
301 States With and Without the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
302 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
